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This paper argues that the triangular trade established among China, the US, and the rest 
of the East Asia suggests that a unilateral renminbi revaluation will not help reduce the 
large US-China trade deficit. The paper shows further that China’s economic overheating 
over the last two years had little to do with its “undervalued” currency. In fact, incentives 
to expand balance sheets, interest rate margin and liberalization, and continued 
interferences on bank lending by local governments contributed to rapid credit expansion 
and overinvestment. In light of the unsustainable US current account deficit, China and 
the rest of the East Asia are likely to experience continued and large capital inflows, 
which will make further sterilization less effective. China’s exit from the current 
exchange rate regime could thus be coordinated with the currencies of the East Asia 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Calls for the renminbi (RMB)—the Chinese currency—to revalue, first advocated 
by former officials of the Japanese Ministry of Finance in December 2002,
1 have 
since become a contentious international policy issue. The Kuroda-Kawai (2002) 
argument for RMB’s revaluation was based on that China was spreading deflation 
“through export growth and a combination of domestic price deflation and an 
exchange rate pegged to the dollar.”
2 They then proposed that China should either 
reflate its economy through monetary expansion or allow the currency to appreciate. 
Their basis of argument, however, can not be corroborated by the trade statistics 
because of China’s still relatively small share in the world trade.
3 Furthermore, given 
that the production and distribution networks are dominated by the multinational 
corporations, the pricing power of Chinese firms in the world market is only limited.
4 
Ultimately, the monetary authorities in the industrial economies have much more 
influence on the price levels of the world economy.   
 
Never mind of the soundness of the reasoning, the insistency for the renminbi to 
revalue, has found a life of its own in the United States, though from a different vein. 
Because China is running a large trade surplus with the US and the US has suffered 
from a large loss of manufacturing jobs (2.7 million by various reports) since 
President Bush took office, the election year politics has forced the Administration to 
act. China is naturally chosen as a target because of political expediency.
5 On the 
trade front, the US has put restrictive quotas on three fast growing categories of 
textile and garments and heavy anti-dumping duties have been levied on Chinese 
made TV sets, shoes, furniture, and socks. On the financial front, Treasury Secretary 
John Snow, Federal Reserve Chairman Allen Greenspan
6 and Commerce Secretary 
Don Evans, in various occasions, have all urged Beijing to either revalue its currency 
or move to a flexible exchange rate regime. US official concerns have also gained 
intellectual backing.
7 Goldstein and Lardy (2003a and 2003b) and Williamson (2003) 
calculated that the renminbi was undervalued by 15-30 percent and therefore a large 
RMB revaluation against US dollar is warranted. They also suggested that the current 
                                                 
1 See “Time for a Switch to Global Reflation” by Kuroda and Kawai, Financial Times, page 23, December 
2, 2002. 
2 Ibid. 
3 China’s exports as a share of the world total, despite its fast growth, remain at 5 % in 2002 calculated 
using the IMF’s Directions of Trade database. In contrast, the export share of Japan, the US, and the EU in 
the total world exports stands at 7%, 11%, and 38%, respectively.   
4 For example, the Wal Mart Stores, Inc., in the US purchases about one eighth of total US imports from 
China. It has more than 80 percent of the 6000 factories in Wal-Mart’s worldwide database of suppliers in 
China. Thus competition for Wal-Mart contracts in China is fierce, potentially pushing down supplier’s 
price and wage rate in China. See “Chinese Workers Pay for Wal-Mart’s Low Price,” Washington Post, 
February 8, 2004 and a related article, “Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful,” Business Week, October 6, 2003.  
5 Indeed, Japan, EU, non-China and non-Japan Asia, Latin America, and other major OPEC countries 
contribute to the four fifths of US trade deficit. 
6 Greenspan raised the issue from the view that large inflow of capital will make the current RMB-dollar 
fixed rate unsustainable. Therefore RMB would have to be revalued to reflect the market pressure. 
7 Fred Bergsten claimed that the IIE was the first to raise the RMB issue. So the causation should be 
reversed.   3
pegged exchange rate regime in China is outmoded and China should quickly move 
to a flexible exchange rate regime.
8  
 
By the second half of 2003, China’s economic growth had started to accelerate 
quickly mainly spurred by rapid bank credit expansions. The seemingly insatiable 
demand for raw materials from China was blamed for the recent hikes of world 
commodity prices, notably some key industrial raw materials such as iron ore, copper, 
aluminum, oil, cotton, and soybean. Indeed, the news came out from the State 
Council of China in May 2004 to reign in the overheating economy sent the stock 
market prices in some key commodity exporting economies into tumbles. China has 
since been regarded as an inflationary force in the world economy. Not surprisingly, 
the undervalued currency is also regarded as a cause of the overheating economy. The 
textbook explanation is that the under-valued RMB gives rise to the expectation of a 
near-term revaluation of the renminbi, which then draws in large capital flows and 
causes the monetary base to expand, thus leading to excessive credit growth. The 
pendulum has swung to the other extreme: China is now blamed for exporting 
inflation, rather than deflation, to the world economy.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II examines whether RMB is very much 
undervalued. Section III argues that a bilateral nominal revaluation of renminbi 
against the US dollar will not help restore the Sino-US trade balances because of the 
triangular trade pattern and China’s own structural factors. Section IV discusses the 
causes of its current macroeconomic overheating. Section V examines China’s 
exchange rate regime at this stage of economic development. Section VI suggests that 
coordinating the next exchange rate realignment is in China and the rest of East 
Asia’s interest. Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Is the RMB Much Undervalued? 
 
One of the reasons why the RMB valuation issue is so controversial is because 
China’s capital account is closed and the renminbi is not traded and therefore there is 
no market determined exchange rate. Fortunately, a valuable piece of evidence one 
could still draw is to look at the non-deliverable forward (NDF) RMB-US dollar rate 
in Hong Kong (Figure 1).
9 To be sure, the RMB NDF was viewed as mostly 
overvalued until November 2002 since its inception in 1996. The overvaluation was 
especially large during the 1997-98 Asian financial crises in which period the RMB 
NDF rate was on average at least 6 percent above its pegged rate with the US dollar. 
Since November 2002, the one-year RMB NDF has only shown a slight 
undervaluation and on average it is less than 2.5 percent from the official RMB-dollar 
exchange rate.
10 Therefore, the RMB NDF market does not seem to indicate that the 
                                                 
8 Asian Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2003. 
9 The renminbi NDF market is one of six large and active NDF markets in Asia. Because of capital and 
exchange controls, NDFs trade outside the country where the currency is the legal tender and their interest 
rate are not necessarily constrained by domestic interest rate (Ma, Ho, and McCauley, 2004 and Ishii, et al,  
2001).  
10 I was pointed out by Dr. Albert Keidel that in November 2002, the US dollar return was for the first time 
lower than that in China, thus making US dollar denominated capital inflow to China profitable, although it   4
RMB-US dollar exchange rate is way off its current fixed rate.
11 Indeed, China’s 
inherent structural weaknesses as reflected by its large magnitude of non-performing 
loans in the banking sector (30-40 percent of GDP), a bleak outlook of its fiscal 
sustainability (gross debt to GDP ratio over 100 percent of GDP), severe structural 
imbalances (severe income inequality in terms of regions, urban-rural, and among 
individuals), and high political risks associated with its incomplete nature of 
economic transition by no means warrant a significant RMB revaluation. To some 
extent, these structural weaknesses appear to have been discounted into the RMB 
NDF rate.  
 
The insistency for a renminbi revaluation is essentially motivated by bilateral 
trade surplus China has with the US, which stands at about $124 billion
12 or about 10 
percent of China’s GDP in 2003, although China’s global trade balance is still 
relatively small, only at 1.8 percent of its 2003 GDP (Table 1). To be sure, the large 
US trade deficit with the rest of the world is fundamentally determined by its large 
savings and investment imbalance. An appreciated renminbi might only change the 
geographic distribution of the US trade deficit, but can not help eliminate it.  
 
The authorities in China, despite persistent pressures for it to revalue, have so far 
resisted a quick and large scale of revaluation. While the Chinese authorities agree a 
flexible exchange rate regime is beneficial for China, they also emphasize the lack of 
market infrastructure that is required by a flexible exchange rate system in the short 
run. Nevertheless, these pressures for a nominal RMB revaluation have already 
forced the Chinese government to react. They have greatly relaxed capital outflows at 
an unprecedented and rapid pace so as to ease the revaluation pressures on the RMB 
due to speculative capital inflows. However, these capital liberalization policies have 
to be sequenced carefully so as to avoid policy inconsistencies between fixed 
exchange rate and independent monetary policy as capital flows have become 
increasingly freer than before.  
 
III.  Why Won’t a Nominal Revaluation of RMB Restore the Sino-US Trade 
Balances? 
 
A. Four underlying factors: Other than the large US savings and investment 
imbalances, from the Chinese perspective, there are four underlying factors that 
would also help understand the argument that a nominal revaluation won’t help 
restore the Sino-US trade balance.  
                                                                                                                                                 
is not clear as which country has higher return if risk premium is added into the calculation. However, one 
could not exclude the signal effect caused by the Japanese and US financial officials, either.   
11 One of course can argue that the NDF market is quite small and could not indicate the overall market 
sentiment. However, the same argument can be applied to other calculations of fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate value as China’s internal balance is difficult to assess as the economy is still moving towards 
a market one. The world economic model used by the IMF does not indicate a large undervaluation of the 
RMB, either (IMF, 2003). 
12 The official US number on US-China trade deficit does not account for the Hong Kong factor. After 
adjusting for Hong Kong re-export or re-import role, the Sino-US trade deficit number will be smaller than 
the US official number (Feenstra, et al…, 1999 and Fung,and Lau, 2003).   5
The first factor is related to China’s trade structure and the trade triangle among 
China, the rest of East Asian economies, and the U.S. At present, about 55 percent of 
the Chinese exports are conducted in the form of processed trade (Table 2 and Figure 
2): China imports intermediate components, mainly from Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, and then assembles them for exports. The final products are then 
disproportionately exported to the US market. This pattern of trade has allowed 
China’s powerful exporting neighbors, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, to divert 
their previously US-bound exports to China, thereby reducing their trade surplus with 
the US. If we look at China’s trade growth by ownership, foreign affiliated firms are 
the engine of China’s trade expansion (Figure 3, 4). If this triangular feature of the 
China-US trade were to be taken into consideration, the adjusted real trade balance 
between China and the US would be far smaller than the current number because 
China’s value-added in the processed trade has been rather minimal, mostly in the 
form of low wages of the assembly workers.  
 
But will a RMB revaluation help reduce the US-China trade deficit? Although a 
revaluation of RMB may appear to make the Chinese exports more expensive, it will 
also make its imports for processing cheaper. As long as exporters, the multinationals 
in this case, can internalize this exchange rate effect, the net export prices due to a 
nominal RMB appreciation from the processed trade sector may not be affected 
much.
13 However, an appreciated RMB will disproportionately hit the exporters in the 
non-processed trade sector, or China’s ordinary trade sector, which is primarily 
dominated by Chinese domestic firms, further exacerbating the painful restructuring 
and the wage depression process. In fact, China’s ordinary trade has already been a 
big importer since 1996 and has been running a slight deficit (Figure 2).  
 
Furthermore, as China is implementing its trade liberalization commitments made 
upon its accession to the WTO in the areas of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(Table 3), it is likely that it will experience increased current account deficit from the 
experiences of most developing countries. Indeed, it appears that China has been 
moving towards this direction as it registered a small trade deficit in the first six 
months in 2004, although it is running a current account surplus largely because of 
the item of current transfers, which reflects speculative capital inflows (Table 4).
14 
 
The second factor has to do with China’s value-added export rebate tax 
implemented in 1998.
15 By addressing export subsidy issue first, China still has ample 
                                                 
13 US short and long term import price elasticity is -.1 and -.3, respectively and its short and long term 
import income elasticity is 1 and 1.8, respectively (Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez, 1998). These 
elasticities show that US imports are less sensitive to exchange rate changes but more sensitive to its 
domestic income changes. 
14 Although by looking at the last column, trade balances, it does not appear to have direct positive 
correlation between China’s tariff reduction and its trade balances. It can still be argued that China’s WTO 
entry is a regime change because it will also remove many non-tariff barriers that are not necessarily 
accompanied with previous tariff reductions. That said, the impact of WTO entry on China’s trade balances 
remains to be seen. 
15 There were some value added export rebate taxes even before 1998. However, the 1998 export-rebate has 
been widespread, affecting all export sectors. Some have argued that reduction of the export taxes should   6
room to maneuver before considering the exchange rate appreciation. In the midst of 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, while 
pledging not to devalue the RMB, also sought to placate the Chinese exporters by 
offering them a up to 17 percent value-added export tax rebate. This policy, still in 
effect today, has certainly contributed to a cost-based and real depreciation of RMB. 
The export tax rebates, which may have contributed to maintain China’s export 
growth over the turbulent period of the Asian financial crisis, are no longer needed at 
a time of robust export growth.   
 
To be sure, China’s rapid export growth since the 1998 has made the export 
rebate tax too expensive to maintain. The export rebate tax, currently estimated at 
about $24 billion or a quarter of China’s trade surplus with the US, also runs the risk 
of impairing the credibility of the government as the Ministry of Finance have to 
backlog the payments to exporters for at least a couple of years.  
 
Not only is the export rebate tax too expensive, it has also led to distorted 
incentives and increased corruption as some exporters round-trip their products in 
order to qualify for rebated taxes. From the income distribution point of view, the 
export rebate tax has a biased impact: tax payers in other sectors of the economy are 
subsidizing the export sector, which by far is the most profitable and fastest-growing 
sector of the Chinese economy. Furthermore, such a value-added export tax rebate is 
also a version of export subsidy. As the trade theory indicates, export subsidies are 
detrimental to a country terms of trade (TOT). Indeed, recent calculation has 
indicated that China’s TOT has deteriorated markedly (Table 5) with respect to all of 
its trading partners. Its TOT deterioration against OECD economies is even more 
pronounced.  
 
Because of China’s large reserves of rural labor, one could never ignore the wage 
rate issue in the calculus of China’s trade competitiveness. This is the third factor and 
perhaps the most important one that is affecting RMB’s real valuation. China’s export 
structure in terms of technology content has improved markedly over the years. 
However, it is puzzling that the wage rates in the labor intensive exporting sector 
have not changed much over the last ten years, roughly staying at around $100 a 
month (Cheung and Xiao, 2003). The on-going restructuring in the state owned 
enterprise sector and the fact that China has an unlimited supply of labor from its vast 
rural area may have contributed to the stagnant wage growth.  
 
In general, if the export sector is more productive, its wage rate should be higher 
than the rest of the economy. Thus, the higher wage rates in the export sector should 
lead to an overall domestic wage increase, usually observed in a country with large 
inflows of FDI where higher relative wages in the export sector tend to pull up the 
overall wage rate of the economy (Feenstra and Gordon, 2001). The Chinese case 
                                                                                                                                                 
be encouraged further as it reduces distortions of the export sector. I agree with this argument if and only if 
China moves to a consumption based tax system, rather than a production based tax system. At this 
moment, only allowing the export sector the privilege of value-added tax rebates but denying that of the 
other sectors will simply create more distortions.    7
shows that the export sector wage rate for assembly workers appears to have had only 
a downward flexibility and an upward rigidity. To some extent, this upward wage 
rigidity is also exacerbated by the collusion between the local government and the 
FDI-funded firms. It is commonly observed that in order to attract FDI to locate in 
their domiciles, local governments are often willing to accommodate the interests of 
foreign-funded firms at the expenses of that of the workers by not strictly enforcing 
labor rules and standards that are essential in bringing about a downward rigidity of 
wages. That said, the labor standards are in general even worse in some domestic and 
privately-owned small and medium manufacturing firms. 
 
The fourth factor is related to China’s FDI regime. Although China is the largest 
recipient of FDI in the world, close to 60 percent of its inflows are still from Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, as well as its own round tripped capital via Hong Kong and more 
recently and increasingly, from offshore banking centers such as the British Virgin 
Islands and Bermuda. These firms are mainly in small and medium size with a short 
investment horizon and low technology content. Their main motives are to take 
advantage of China’s cheap labor, generous fiscal incentives offered by both central 
and local governments, and securer property rights protection not usually offered to 
domestic investors. For example, the income tax of foreign funded firms is a case in 
point. At present, the income tax rate is only 15 percent for foreign-funded and joint 
venture firms in economic zones, less than half of the 33 percent levied on domestic 
firms. In addition, foreign invested enterprises are privileged to have an income tax 
exemption in the first 2 years after making profits and an income tax reduction by 
half in the following 3 years. For the so-called FDI funded hi-tech firms, income tax 
reduction by half is extended for 6 years. These tax incentives are further sweetened 
by concessions that stipulate favorite treatment of land, raw materials, energy, and 
labor usage. Fiscal subsidies have made the real costs of capital of FDI-funded firms, 
especially of those firms in the processed trade sector, competitive in world markets.  
 
That said, as long as these four underlying factors of China’s export 
competitiveness are still in place, a simple revaluation of RMB, in spite of its 
expediency, will not be able to address the concerns of the policy makers in the US: 
reducing trade deficit with China and halting job losses in the manufacturing sector. 
Even if China were to appreciate its currency by 15 to 25 percent in nominal terms as 
suggested by Morris Goldstein and Nicolas Lardy of the Institute for International 
Economics (2003a, b), the nominal appreciation could easily be offset by downward 
wage flexibility, fiscal incentives, cheaper intermediate imports, and value-added 
export rebate taxes. 
 
B. Dealing with the Sino-US Trade Imbalances: Then what should be China’s 
appropriate responses to RMB’s revaluation pressured by both the U.S. and the 
ensued market expectation? In fact, if properly framed, the RMB valuation policy 
could have a natural connection with China’s continued structural reform in trade and 
its institutional convergence efforts by its WTO obligations.  
 
   8
In the near term, to deflect immediate pressures to revalue its currency, China 
should consider phasing out or even revoking the 17 percent value-added export 
rebate taxes implemented in 1998.
16 By phasing out the export rebate tax completely, 
China would effectively allow RMB’s real appreciation against the US dollar, thus 
mitigating protectionist pressure from the US. This policy initiative will show that 
China is a responsible partner in the global economic adjustment process. In fact, the 
most significant part of this policy is that it suits China’s own interests well as the 
export rebate tax program has become outdated and too expensive to maintain.  
 
Moreover, China could use this opportunity to take steps to streamline its FDI 
regimes and make them consistent with China’s WTO commitment. In spite of 
China’s large inflows of FDI, China is in fact an underachiever to attract FDI from 
large multinational companies of the OECD economies (Wei, 2000). There are 
reasons why multinational firms are still reluctant to relocate to China. For instance, a 
recent survey conducted by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
17 
shows, despite the fact that China has become a favorite place for Japanese investors, 
its FDI policies and regulations still lack maturity, transparency, and predictability. 
The survey scores on China in those areas have been the worst among countries that 
Japanese firms have had investment. Even with extensive incentives in place, the 
current FDI related tax system remains opaque and is subject to frequent changes. A 
similar country case study done by the McKinsey Global Institute (2003) also 
corroborates the JBIC survey findings. The current FDI regime, despite its quantity 
success, needs to be improved further through greater transparency and predictability 
to reach a quality success by attracting large scale of investments from transnational 
companies, for they tend to offer high technology contents that will create large 
demand for high-skilled labor with higher wages, thus elevating the relative wage rate 
between the FDI sector and the domestic sector so that the overall wage rate in the 
economy can also be lifted. Such an effect will certainly generate large and sustained 
domestic demand.  
 
In fact, making China’s FDI regime consistent to the best practices of 
international norms now also serves to discourage speculative capital flows concealed 
in the form of FDI, which in turn will help reduce pressures on RMB.  
 
These structural reform measures will also help secure China as a market 
economy status in the US anti-dumping cases. Without this status, it will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Chinese firms to win any anti-dumping 
cases in US courts.
18  
 
IV.  Linking China’s Exchange Rate with its Current Macroeconomic 
Overheating: Would a Revaluation Help Cool the Economy? 
                                                 
16 China just announced on October 15 there will be a three percentage reduction of the export rebate tax 
starting on January 1 2004. 
17 The Annual Survey on Japanese Investment Overseas, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 2002. 
18 China has always been an easy target of US anti-dumping cases. It has occupied 15 percent of US anti-
dumping cases since 1981.   9
 
A. Economic Overheating and Torrid Pace of Investment
19: By various economic 
indicators, the Chinese economy until September of 2004 appeared to have entered 
into another cycle of rapid growth spearheaded by rapid fixed assets investment in 5 
sectors: real estate development, steel, electricity generation, urban construction, and 
the chemical sector. These five sectors accounted for 59 percent of total fixed 
investment in 2003. Fixed assets investment as a share of GDP reached to 46.8 
percent in the first ten months of 2004, one of the highest levels in history (Table 6). 
It is estimated that the projects under construction in 2003 amounted to the combined 
values of the last three years. In particular, investment in steel, aluminum, cement, 
and automobile leaped by 96.6%, 92.9%, 121.9%, and 70%, respectively.  
 
In the first two month in 2004, investment in 16 out of 30 major industries in the 
manufacturing sector doubled. For example, investment in the steel industry and the 
construction material sector increased by 172.6% and 137.4%, respectively. With 
regards to steel, China already produced 200 million tons of steel in 2003, which has 
exceeded the total steel outputs of Japan and the US combined.  
 
Given the current pace of investment, it is forecasted that China’s auto output will 
double in three years. Such a torrid pace of investment has caused a rapid rise of the 
prices of raw industrial materials.  
 
China is now facing a severe energy and electricity shortage with frequent 
blackouts in the coastal region. One sign that the economy is red hot is that the 
electricity consumption almost doubled in 2003 over the average of the previous ten 
years (Figure 5). One comparison is rather telling: Although China’s GDP is only one 
fifth of Japan’s, its electricity consumption has already outpaced Japan’s and China’s 
oil imports have also surpassed Japan as the second largest oil importer in the world. 
This broad-brushed comparison indicates that China’s industries are suffering from 
energy efficiency problem and probably due to the lack of scale of economies.
20  
 
B. Relationship between overheating and undervalued currency: As the Chinese 
economy is a bank-based economy (Table 7), the fixed asset investments are 
primarily funded by the banking sector. Indeed, the growth rate of M2 has returned to 
its historical high after several years of deceleration (Table 4). Some have attributed 
the overheating in China to an undervalued currency (for example, Eichengreen, 
2004). The rationale behind it is that China’s undervalued currency raises the 
expectation of a revaluation in the future, which then draws large capital inflows into 
the country and therefore expands the monetary base. In order to sterilize the impact 
of capital inflows, the monetary authority has to engage in open market operations to 
buy foreign assets and sell domestic assets at the equal amount. However, this 
operation also creates demand for domestic assets and will eventually drive up their 
                                                 
19 Please also see Ma and McCauley (2004b) for a detailed account of overinvestment in selected sectors. 
20 A recent national survey shows that there were 870 steel plants across the country of which 600 were 
small and low tech built over the last two years (James Kynge, “The Locomotive’s Reassuring Slowdown,”   
P6, Financial Times, October 1 2004).   10
returns. The monetary authority is also facing a dilemma: It can not raise the interest 
rate to cool the red hot investment for the fear that it would attract further capital 
inflows, which will in turn cause the monetary base to expand further. Thus, the only 
way out is to revalue the currency.    
 
However, this textbook explanation on the cause of China’s current economic 
overheating needs some reality check.
21 First, China is not facing a fundamental 
policy inconsistency between its exchange rate stability and its autonomous monetary 
policy as long as it still maintains capital controls. In spite of some recent steps that 
may have made capital control more porous, China still maintains strict capital 
control in areas related to portfolio investment and bank loans. Should they wish, the 
authorities can still tighten its capital controls by discouraging speculative capital 
inflows.
22  There is no reason that China can not raise its interest rates at this time to 
discourage over investment. The issue really lies at whether the interest rate 
instrument is effective enough under the current macroeconomic context.  
 
Second, a statistical test does not seem to support the causal relationship between 
China’s accumulations of foreign exchange reserves and its M2 growth. A Granger 
causality test, which uses the monthly data of China’s foreign exchange reserves and 
M2 from 2000 to the first quarter of 2004, indicates that the foreign exchange 
reserves do not Granger cause M2, although the M2 Granger causes the reserve 
accumulations (Table 8).   
 
There are, however, three alternative micro-level factors that can perhaps better 
explain the causes of this cycle of China’s economic overheating. The first factor has 
to do with the competition among the big four state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs) to get listed in stock market. The second one is related to the on-going 
interest rate liberalization. The third one is connected to the local government 
overinvestment because of the lack of domestic market integration. 
  
B.1. Competition to get listed first: China’s big four SOCBs still suffer from large 
bad loans, inadequate capital and loan loss provisions, poor risk-management skills, 
ineffective corporate governance, over-staffed labor forces in over-extended branches, 
and constant government interferences. As China is opening up its banking sector for 
foreign competition under its WTO commitment, the Big Four’s current financial 
state poses as a serious risk to the economy. Obviously, China’s new leadership has 
recognized the serious nature of the problem and they have put banking sector reform 
as one of the highest priorities.  
 
                                                 
21 This explanation explicitly assumes that China’s capital control is ineffective. However, Ma and 
McCauley (2004) show that despite a leaky capital account, China’s capital control is still effectiveness as 
indicated by large onshore and offshore interest rate differentials.  
22 Indeed, as argued above, making the FDI regime consistent with China’s WTO obligation by reducing 
the existing pervasive fiscal incentives can serve as an effective deterrence to keep some speculative flows 
imbedded in the form of FDI out of the country.    11
The present strategy to banking sector reform has some resemblance to what the 
government has done to the state-owned enterprises: improve corporate governance 
via gradual ownership change. It is believed that once the banks are listed in overseas 
stock markets, the SOCBs will be subject to international accounting standards and 
the international norms of corporate governance. The management of these SOCBs 
will thus improve, so will their profitability. However, banks are quite different from 
industrial firms, they have to maintain a minimum 8 percent capital in order to be able 
to operate, let alone getting listed. By all means, none of the Big Four SOCBs at this 
juncture can satisfy the minimum requirement to get listed overseas because of their 
negative net worth. Despite recent aggressive measures to deal with NPL problems
23, 
including using $45 billion of foreign exchange reserves to write off NPLs, only two 
SOCBs, the Bank of China and the Construction Bank of China, are currently close to 
reach a minimum of 8 percent of equity of the BIS standard.  
 
The existing government guidelines for stock market listing are that as long as 
NPLs can be controlled under ten percent and capital adequacy ratio is above the 
minimum 8 percent, any SOCBs can get approval for listing in overseas stock 
markets. Apparently, getting listed first will show that the bank managers are doing a 
good job and such recognition appears to be important for their future careers. Thus, 
great emphases have been attached to reducing NPLs at least on the book in order to 
get listed first
24. The question is how to do it. Based on their existing profitability and 
no-further external assistance to write off bad loans, Chan-Lee, Liu and Yoshitomi 
(2002) estimated that it would take the SOCBs 10 to 15 years to grow out of their 
NPL problems under the assumption that the SOCBs will have no new bad loans 
accrued during the same period of the time. 
 
However, there appears to be an easy way out of the problem at least in the short 
run and this has been supported by many inside China. This view purports that 
China’s NPL problem is not as serious as what the observers in the West feared. As 
NPLs are measured as a share of total loans, from the accounting point of view, as 
long as the denominator, the total loans, can grow fast enough each year, the NPL 
ratio will tend to shrink yearly. This view is based on one implicit assumption, that is, 
there are no new NPLs or smaller amount of NPLs accruing in the future. It also 
means that for banks to be able to fulfill such a goal, the banks’ behavior would have 
to change. That is, they must possess better corporate governance and risk 
management skills so that new NPLs will have to be maintained at a minimum level. 
The growing out strategy can be illustrated using a numerical example: Suppose the 
current NPLs in a bank are 28 percent of the loans and the annual growth rate of loans 
per year is 10 percent. So after one year, the NPL will decline automatically by 2.5 
percent (.28/(1+.1)=25.5). If the loan growth rate is 10 percent per year, it means that 
every 7 years the total amount of loans will double. Consequently, the NPLs will be 
shrunk by half. However, if the assumption is modified to allow the possibility that a 
                                                 
23 See Liu (2003) for a detailed account of these measures. 
24 Other measures such as transferring bad loans to asset management companies have also been done. But 
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10 percent of new loans will turn bad per year, the NPL ratio as a share of total loans 
will be reduced by only 2 percent in 7 years!  
 
Although the argument of using the balance-sheet approach to reducing NPLs is 
dubious, it will probably have some immediate effect on banks’ balance sheet in the 
short term because new NPLs take time to emerge. Therefore, the incentive to expand 
the balance sheet to shrink NPLs on the book has prompted banks to start lending 
aggressively again. Unlike previous cycles of rapid bank credit expansion, this time 
the bank lending has been able to bypass the loss-making state-owned enterprises and 
go directly to firms that appear to be profitable under the current market conditions. 
In particular, property sectors, residential mortgage, consumer loans, and local 
government guaranteed corporations have seen a rapid rise of loans. Indeed, 
examining the loan growth data of the big four state-owned commercial banks, except 
for Bank of China, all have registered rapid loan growth. In particular, Construction 
Bank of China had a loan growth rate of 27.8 in 2003. 
 
B.2. Large Interest Rate Margin and Interest Rate Liberalization:  Another factor 
that may have contributed to rapid extension of credit has to do with favorable 
interest rate margin. Until the end of 2002, China was still lingering on deflation 
(Figure 6). Both lending and in particular deposit rates were cut to encourage 
investment and consumption. The officially set interest rate margin for both one-year 
lending and deposit rate was 3.33% [5.31%-1.98%] until the interest rate 
liberalization on January 1 2004. The large interest rate market also encourages banks 
to extend loans in addition to the growing out of the NPL motives. 
 
China’s interest rate liberalization starting on January 1 2004 also contributed to 
excessive lending in the banking system. The on-going interest rate liberalization 
follows a sequencing strategy that liberalizes the lending rate and then the deposit rate 
so as to prevent excessive competition for deposits among banks. Lending rates were 
until October 29
th 2004 allowed to be fluctuated within a range of minus 10% and 
positive 170% of the standard lending rate of 5.31 percent set by the central bank. 
Because the deposit rate has been lowered over the last couple of years to a historic 
low (for example, one year deposit rate is only 1.98 percent and the real interest rate 
has turned negative for depositors), the interest margin after the interest rate 
liberalization has made banks even more profitable to lend than before.  
 
B.3. Local government behavior: Local governments have played a positive role 
in promoting local economic development and they are a part of the institutional 
foundations of China’s transition to market economy (Qian, 1999). Because local 
governments can not use debt financing, their financial sources are limited to tax 
revenues and bank loans. Before 1995, local governments were able to influence local 
branches of the big four SOCBs to lend to local government-owned SOEs or to local 
government sponsored enterprises. After 1995 and until recently, this channel of 
influence was less effective as the lending decisions of the big four SOCBs have been 
centralized at the headquarters and loan officers are made responsible for loans they 
made over the life time of the loans.    13
However, with the emergences of regional and city commercial banks in which 
the local governments are often the major share holders, local governments can still 
have access to bank loans from their own regional banks. This is perhaps the reason 
why in this current economic cycle, the loan growth rate of the second tier banks 
(regional and city commercial banks) is on average 38 percent, as against 13 percent 
of the big four SOCBs. In addition, enterprises sponsored by local government can 
use land and local government issued guarantees to gain access to loans both from 
regional city commercial banks as well as the big four SOCBs.  
 
Bank financing allows local governments to engage in large scale of urban sector 
renewal projects by building landmarks and in investment in sectors that are at this 
moment in the upturns of the economic cycle such as automobiles, steel, cement, and 
construction materials. In the first two months of 2004, the central government 
sponsored fixed asset investment only increased by 12.1 percent, whereas the local 
governments-sponsored fixed asset investment increased by 64.9 percent. Local 
government involvement in fixed asset investment is mainly motivated by local jobs 
and growth performance and these targets are often used as criteria for promotion of 
local officials. Another factor that led local governments to rush to invest in similar 
types of industries is that China’s domestic market still has many barriers to internal 
trade, often erected by the local governments themselves, thus reducing specialization 
and the scale of economies.
25 
 
C. Will inflation accelerate further?  China’s lingering deflation ended in January 
2003. Inflation rate accelerated quickly in 2004, peaked at 5.3 in July and dropped to 
4.3 percent in November 2004 (Figure 6). The biggest rise in the CPI component is 
food and within the food category, the grain price has jumped up quickly since the 
end of 2003. It rose 34 percent in April 2004 from the same time period last year. A 
couple of factors have contributed to the sharp increase of grain prices in China. One 
is that the grain price in China has been stagnant and it is relatively lower than the 
international price for some time, thus discouraging farmers’ incentive from planting 
grains. The share of acreage devoted to grain production in the total acreage sown per 
year has declined steadily from 73.43 percent in 1995 to 67.2 percent in 2002. In 
recent years, the rate of decline has accelerated. For example, the rate of decline in 
terms of total acreage devoted to grain production was 2.2 percent per year from 1999 
to 2002. As the per-unit yield of grain crops has not increased much, China’s total 
output of grain dropped and consequently the grain price was driven up.  
 
But will inflation continue to accelerate? The consumer price index, once peaked 
at 5.3 percent, has already shown a downward trend. Because a set of macroeconomic 
adjustment policies have been put in place to reduce excessive investment in steel, 
construction materials, chemical, and automobile sectors since the second quarter of 
2004, it is expected that investment will certainly experience a hard landing. Indeed, 
the consumer goods sector probably is not likely to experience a rapid increase of 
prices at all. Out of 600 essential consumer products, 473 of them still exceed demand 
and 127 of them have a balanced demand and supply (Huang, 2004). Because of 
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newly added production capacity, the supply of these key consumer products will 
likely continue to exceed demand. This is perhaps the reason why the overall CPI has 
not increased sharply as the food price has because the non-food consumption basket 
occupies 60 to 70 percent of the weight in the overall CPI.  
 
But would the grain price continue to soar? Probably not for two reasons: One is 
that acreage devoted to grain production has rebounded by 20 million mu or 8 percent 
of 2002 total grain acreage because of increased incentive package for grain 
production. Second, China’s imports of grain are likely to increase to partly offset the 
temporary shortage of grains. In fact, the grain imports could be linked to the US 
trade politics by adding the grain purchase as one of the important import items on 
the shopping list.  
 
Another important reason is that there is no general wage-led inflation unlike the 
high inflation episode in 1988 and 1993. The unemployment pressure is still high 
because of on-going SOE restructuring and China’s large rural labor pool, despite the 
fact that the wage rate for skilled labor has increased. The estimated urban 
unemployment is still hovering around 11 percent. Thus, it is unlikely that a wage-led 
general price increase will materialize. Indeed, this round of rapid economic 
expansion is largely investment driven. To put this number into context, the 
consumption as a share of GDP in China is only 60 percent, while it is 80 percent for 
developed countries, 74 percent for developing countries, and 69 percent for East 
Asian economies. The only difference this time is that the private investment has 
picked up. 
 
D. Will China have a soft-landing this time around? The central bank has applied 
a set of both direct and indirect monetary policy instruments to cool down the growth 
by cutting back credit expansions. These measures include: Issuing central bank bills 
for the purpose of conducting open market operations to mop up excessive liquity, 
raising required reserve ratio to 7.5 percent, using window guidance (moral suasion) 
to reduce lending to property development, steel, electricity generation, urban 
construction projects, and chemical sector. As some of the investments are insensitive 
to interest rates, some administrative controls are also implemented. The State 
Council has initiated a set of multi-agency coordination policies to reign in the run-
away economy. The Bank Supervision Commission has started on-spot bank 
examinations on loans to the 5 restrictive sectors. The National Development and 
Reform Commission is instrumental in reigning in investment in construction 
material sector (steel, cement, and aluminum). It has taken steps to approve to close 
unauthorized development zones, return illegally claimed farm land, and terminate 
inefficient investments that do not have economies of scale. Ministry of Land and 
Natural Resources has closed 27000 development zones so far. Ministry of Finance 
has recently postponed issuing of treasury bonds of 110 billion and has announced 
that its active fiscal policy is now at a neutral position. In addition, China’s Security 
and Regulatory Commission stopped taking application of IPOs for firms in steel, 
cement, and aluminum related sectors and listed firms in these three sectors have been 
constrained from issuing new shares.    15
These coordinated policy measures have started to take shape, but their 
effectiveness still remains to be seen. Because the big four commercial banks are still 
within the control of the state which dominate the banking sector, as long as the 
policy makers can effectively decelerate rapid bank lending to the 5 overheating 
sectors, it is still possible for the central government to cool down the red hot sectors 
and bring the economy to a soft-landing. However, whether the soft-landing will be a 
smooth one will hinge on whether the central government can use more market based 
measures to cool down the economy.  
 
Recent statistics have shown that M2 and credit growth have been under control. 
The inflation rate has also moderated greatly.  More importantly, the consolidation of 
political power to President Hu will make dissenting voice against administrative 
controls less tolerable. Thus, the probability for the government to secure a soft-
landing becomes much higher. 
 
V.  An Optimal Exchange Regime for China 
 
Exchange rate regimes are generally classified as fixed, intermediate, and floating 
arrangements. Within each category there are also finer distinctions that depend on 
frequency of adjustment and degrees of changes. Table 9 presented a simple 
classification of exchange regimes. The question is, at this stage of economic 
development, what is the optimal exchange rate regime for China? Before answering 
this question, let’s first examine empirical evidences as what types of exchange rate 
regime bring about better results in terms of price stability and economic growth in 
the long run. According to an IMF study (2003), among 5 categories of exchange rate 
regimes, the one with limited flexibility has the best track record because it is 
associated with the highest per-capita GDP growth and the lowest annual inflation 
during the period between 1970 and 2001. The managed floating regime has the 
second best per-capita income record but rather high annual inflation. The pegged 
exchange rate regime has a slightly lower growth record than the managed floating 
but its inflation performance is better than managed floating. In both categories of 
income growth and inflation rate, freely floating and dual or multiple exchange rate 
regimes performed the worst (Table 10).  
 
Open economies will always face the trilemma problems: The tradeoffs among 
independent monetary policy, stability in the exchange rate, and the free movement of 
capital (Mundell, 1963). Among the three objectives, only two policy objectives can 
be reached simultaneously. Figure 7 puts the three objectives at the vertices of a 
triangle and the three connecting lines represent the tradeoff for any two policy 
objectives to be achieved simultaneously. At this juncture, China does not allow 
freedom for capital to move in and out of the country. Thus it can have a fixed 
exchange rate regime and autonomy of its monetary policy. In fact, recent steps in 
liberalizing capital outflows (See box 1) have certainly made China’s capital controls 
more porous, which in turn will threat the inherent policy consistency between the 
fixed rate and its autonomous monetary policy. If China chooses to relax its capital   16
control further, it should then think of moving to a more flexibility exchange rate 





A. Why is the current fixed exchange rate regime still workable?  Although both 
the US Treasury and some prominent economists have advised that China will be 
better served if it were to move to a flexible exchange rate regime (Eichengreen, 2004, 
Goldstein and Lardy, 2003), the Chinese government, while acknowledging its 
intention to eventually move to a flexible exchange rate regime, has maintained the 
importance of RMB’s stability in the short term. One could simply interpret such 
intransigence as that the Chinese government does not want to yield to foreign 
pressure. On the other hand, if we take China’s development strategy and its state of 
institutional convergence to a market economy into consideration, its hesitance to 
move to a flexible exchange rate is quite understandable.  
 
China is in fact using the pegged exchange rate as a nominal anchor so that it 
could leverage on credibility and better institutions of the US. It is in fact running an 
adjustable pegged exchange rate akin to the pre-1971 Bretton Woods System for two 
reasons. The first reason is related to its export-led development strategy and such a 
strategy requires a stable if not under-valued currency, capital controls and 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves largely denominated in the center country 
currency, the US dollar (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2003). The second 
reason is related to the lack of development of its own credible domestic institutions. 
China’s central bank is directly under the control of the State Council and it has 
limited independence in conducting monetary policy. The limited role of 
independence may also result from the fact that the financial sector is still dominated 
by the state. Thus, central bank independence does not make much difference. Under 
the current circumstances, the central bank independence in China could run the risk 
of becoming bureaucratic independence because to which branch of the government 
Box1: Recent Changes on Regulations on Foreign Exchange Controls  
  March 2003: Beijing, Tianjing, Sichuan, and Helongjiang started 
experiments to relax Chinese firms overseas FDI requirement. RMB assets 
can be used to exchange foreign currency for FDI purposes. 
  May 2003: If a payment made by the foreign currency credit card exceeds 
the foreign currency deposit, the difference can be paid using RMB. 
  August, 2003: Multinational corporations’ non-trade related payments are 
allowed to be conducted using either foreign currency or RMB. 
  September, 2003: Firms do not have to submit foreign exchange earned 
from current account related earnings such as international engineering 
contract, labor contract, international shipping and fees from shipping 
service. 
  September, 2003: Residents and non-residents can bring in and out $5000 
per person. Domestic residents for overseas travel can carry up to $5000 
cash per person (State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 2004)   17
the central bank is accountable is not clear.
26 Thus, if the institutional credibility is 
not yet formed, some kind of pre-commitment such as the fixed peg may be a better 
way to prevent the time inconsistency problem. In a theoretical framework, Barro and 
Gordon (1983) demonstrated convincingly that by instituting a monetary rule, policy 
makers can prevent monetary policy inconsistency caused by surprise inflation under 
rational expectation.  
 
At a more technical level, although China’s central bank is able to use open 
market operations, its main monetary policy instrument remains to target the quantity 
of money, rather than the interest rate, because the market mechanism of interest rate 
determination is still pre-mature. China’s under-developed money market and its 
shallow government bond market will pose great challenges for the authorities to 
manage a flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
Thus, given its development strategy and its stage of institutional development, it 
is a rational choice to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor so the country can 
leverage on a better foreign institution that has greater credibility. In the past, for 
countries that do not have domestic institutional credibility, tying one’s currency to 
gold is an act of credible commitment (Bordo, 2003).  This is similar to the period of 
pre-collapse of the Bretton Woods System when the US dollar was used as a nominal 
anchor by the periphery countries as long as the US is running a prudent monetary 
policy. The reason that China has pegged its currency for so long is because the 
Greenspan-led Fed has done a good job in maintaining price stability and robust 
growth rate in the US. By leaving the difficult task of managing the exchange rate to 
the Fed, the Chinese policy makers can pursue its domestic development agenda with 
more focus as long as they can maintain effective capital control. Indeed, this strategy 
has worked well for Japan and the Western European countries before the fall of the 
Bretton Woods System in 1973. These economies had quickly recovered from their 
ruinous war-torn economies. As their per capita income caught up with that of the US, 
their institutional credibility was also regained. As a result of such strategy, these 
economies could graduate to move to the center (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Garber, 2003). 
 
It may be argued that China may not have the luxury as those economies that have 
successfully moved to the center because today’s international monetary arrangement 
no longer allows such strategy to take place. In particular, the US has less a tolerance 
nowadays for running a large current account deficit and accumulating foreign debt. 
In addition, the global financial markets are more integrated and capital control has 
become much more difficult to enforce. Indeed, Cheun-Chinn-Fujii (2003) examine 
three criteria of economic integration, namely real interest parity, uncovered interest 
parity, and relative purchasing power parity. They find that China is surprisingly 
positive for integration with the US. If this evidence can stand the rigorous test of 
statistics, it is indeed a positive sign for pegging the dollar for reasons of both 
economic and institutional convergence. Such convergence will also help shore up 
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China’s own institutions eventually. On the other hand, the Cheun-Chinn-Eiji result 
also indicates that as capital controls become less restrictive, China’s ability to 
conduct independent monetary policy has thus become less effective. 
 
B. Preconditions to move to a flexible exchange rate regime:  While China’s 
pegged exchange rate regime is still in place, recent policy initiatives to relax capital 
controls indicate that China’s capital account will become more open in the future. As 
capital controls are gradually relaxed, the monetary authority will therefore face 
increased difficulty in maintaining its exchange rate stability and conducting 
independent monetary policy, thus raising fundamental policy inconsistency. If China 
ever decides to further relax its capital controls, it should now have a concrete 
strategy to make a transition from the current system of using the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor to a system that relies on credible domestic nominal anchors, which 
in turn require some minimum institutions that can support a domestic nominal 
anchor credibly. These basic institutions should include central bank independence in 
the sense of independent from financing the government fiscal deficits, inflation 
targeting to establish credibility in maintaining price stability (Bordo, 2003 and 
Svensson, 2002), and institutions that can monitoring currency mismatches due to 
increased volatility of a flexible exchange rate regime(Goldstein, 2002).  
 
At this juncture, although China does not have the true sense of central bank 
independence, it does still have some of the basic elements. That is, its 1995 Central 
Bank Law clearly stipulates that the central bank is forbidden to monetize 
government fiscal deficits.  
 
China has taken a gradual approach to interest rate liberalization. It is very likely 
that during the course of interest rate liberalization that the monetary authority will 
face challenges in maintaining goals of inflation targeting as the interest rate 
liberalization tends to increase uncertainties in financial contracts and therefore 
increases volatility. In addition, interest rate liberalization can also erode the franchise 
value of the banking sector, thus raising macroeconomic instability. Therefore, the 
on-going domestic interest rate liberalization will certainly complicate China’s move 
to a monetary regime that is centered on inflation targeting. During the transition 
period, domestic market development such as money market, forward exchange rate 
market, developing hedging instruments, and forming the habit of using hedges to 
manage risks is also critical to creating credible domestic nominal anchors. 
 
It is not inconsistent to move towards a flexible exchange rate regime while still 
keeping the capital control in place (Eichengreen, 2004).  Capital controls can still 
give policy makers breathing time to build strong domestic monetary institutions. But 
the question is what kind of intermediate regime is best suited for China. Some have 
offered a band, a basket peg, and a crawling peg after China has exited from the 
existing pegged exchange rate regime (Williamson, 2003, Chan-Lee, et al, 2002). 
Despite the advantages of flexibility of these intermediate regimes, they are 
nevertheless susceptible to big shocks, either internal or external, inability to induce 
stabilizing speculation, and furnishing credible nominal anchor (Glodstein, 2002).   19
Thus, a managed floating regime with enhanced monitoring of capital flows, a 
version of an intermediate regime proposed by Goldstein (2002) that allows inherent 
exchange rate flexibility, if it is also supported by credible nominal anchor such as 
inflation targeting and central bank independence and complemented by closely 
monitoring currency mismatches, can probably work better for China. However, 
because of the close production cum distribution network established in Asia, China’s 
future exchange rate arrangement should also take into consideration of its 
neighboring economies. Its participation in the arrangement of the regional exchange 
rate system will help resolve the current global imbalance. 
 
VI.  Coordinating the Next Exchange Rate Realignment with the East Asian 
Economies is China’s Interest 
 
Over the past two years, the Bush administration has pursued a policy that 
attempts to address the US trade deficit bilaterally with China alone by trying to 
jawbone the country to revaluing the renminbi (RMB). Not surprisingly, the policy 
has not worked for an obvious reason: The exchange rate issue is traditionally a 
macroeconomic one and should be discussed by looking at multilateral rather than 
bilateral trade balances. In addition, China is now at the center of an East Asian trade 
triangle, importing technology-intensive and sophisticated intermediate goods such as 
parts and components as well as commodities from Japan, the newly industrialized 
economies (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore), and the ASEAN countries. Thus, China alone 
cannot become the world’s workshop. Only the East Asian region as a whole can play 
that role. If the onus of exchange rate adjustment falls on China alone and other 
countries do not do their part, a “free rider” problem will arise and the U.S.-East Asia 
imbalance will not be resolved. Moreover, a large one-time revaluation of the RMB 
would likely create a massive asset price bubble in China, a repeat of Japan’s 
experience after the 1985 Plaza Accord. 
 
While China can still use some structural measures as suggested in Section III to 
reduce pressures on immediate RMB revaluation, these measures will increasingly 
become less effective if the US twin-deficits become unsustainable and result to a 
collapse of the US dollar, which in turn will induce large capital inflows into China 
and make the sterilization operations become less effective in the medium term. 
Absent a policy change, China will run the risk of encouraging large, speculative, 
short-term capital inflows, pushing its foreign exchange reserves still higher. The 
monetary base and domestic credit supply could thus expand rapidly, leading to 
soaring inflation again. 
 
 
Indeed, the likelihood of a further large US dollar decline is real. The U.S. is 
currently running large and unsustainable twin deficits (the budget and trade deficit), 
both at close to 5% of GDP in 2003. At the same time, the East Asian region is 
collectively running a large trade surplus with the U.S. and rapidly accumulating 
foreign exchange reserves, which are then largely returned to the U.S. to finance its 
budget deficit.    20
This arrangement will come under great stress if the U.S. economy slows 
substantially. Recent movements in the U.S. 10-year bond rate to slightly over 4%, a 
rather low rate, in spite of four consecutive quarter-point interest rate increases by the 
Federal Reserve Board, indicate that the market has begun to discount the probability 
of a major economic slowdown after the November presidential election. The U.S. 
economy, which already peaked earlier this year in an upward election year cycle, 
will eventually have to make major adjustments given the twin deficits. Although it is 
uncertain how the adjustment process will play out, one remedy is both fairly clear 
and fairly likely based on past experience: The dollar will have to depreciate 
substantially so as to allow the U.S. trade balance to return to a sustainable path. A 
recent OECD study (2004) shows that it would take a 22.5% decline in the trade-
weighted value of the dollar in order for the U.S. current account deficit to fall by one 
percentage point of GDP. Extrapolating from this, the dollar would have to fall by 
45% to return the U.S. trade deficit to a tolerable 3% of GDP. 
 
Obviously, the currencies of East Asia will have to play a major part in this 
adjustment. Although in the past year or so the dollar has already declined 
significantly against the euro, appreciation of the East Asian currencies has been 
negligible (Figure 8, 9, 10). This is because the large capital flows into East Asia have 
been effectively sterilized as Japan, China, and other economies in the region were on 
the brink of deflation or rapid disinflation, making the costs of sterilization 
insignificant. 
 
However, sterilization cannot continue indefinitely. The East Asian region has 
already accumulated substantial foreign exchange reserves in the past year and 
accelerating inflation has become a real policy concern. Even Japan, the country most 
marred by deflation, is contemplating monetary policy options beyond its current zero 
interest rate policy as its economic recovery gathers strength. Although there is still 
room for China to further sterilize capital inflows, depending on the portfolio 
allocation of China’s foreign exchange reserves, capital losses have already occurred 
on the short-term side of the portfolio allocation (Figure 11). 
 
The production cum distribution networks established in East Asia underscore the 
importance of price stability throughout the region. The large trade component of 
GDP in the region suggests that exchange rate stability remains an important policy 
objective. To some extent, China and the rest of the East Asian economies are in a 
classical “Prisoner’s Dilemma” scenario. The first mover to revalue will likely to 
receive the worst reward if others in the group do not follow suit, thus giving rise the 
“free rider” problem. Thus an optimal and stable equilibrium is coordination in their 
next currency realignment against the US dollar.  
 
Clearly, the lack of policy coordination experience and the weak financial 
infrastructure still make it premature for East Asian countries to move toward an 
EMS-type, mutually-pegged, joint floating with a band. Nevertheless, the region 
should take the first step toward a negotiated agreement as how much appreciation 
against the dollar each currency concerned has to undertake. Each country in East   21
Asia should then allow its currency to move within a band set around the new 
exchange rate level according to its own market and macroeconomic conditions. The 
band can be set narrowly, for example, plus or minus 5%-6%, for countries with 
greater policy credibility; for those economies with relatively less policy credibility, 
the band can be set wider, say, plus or minus 10%-12%. Each economy in the region 
should then make a commitment to defend the lower bound of the band. 
 
There are three reasons why such a band would be appropriate for and defensible 
by East Asia: First, the region has traditionally had good macroeconomic 
fundamentals, which helps instill market confidence. Second, given the lack of 
adequate legal, regulatory, and informational institutions in the region, the developing 
East Asian economies such as China can still apply Chilean-type capital controls to 
reduce volatile short-term capital flows, as a substitute for effective market-based 
intuitions. Third, the lessons of the Asian financial crisis have shown that the IMF, 
under the strong influence of the United States, could not act as a global lender of last 
resort during the capital account crisis that took place in Asia in 1997 because the U.S. 
Congress rightly realized that U.S. taxpayers’ money should not be used to bail out 
non-U.S. institutions caught in emerging-market crises. Given the limited funds each 
emerging economy in East Asia can draw on, it is simply impossible for them to stem 
massive capital outflows. This, in turn, highlights the need for a regional monetary 
facility specifically aimed at the type of capital account crisis that has strong spillover 
effects in terms of regional contagion. The region has already started to pool its 
foreign exchange reserves to prevent such a crisis from recurring. It is only prudent 
for East Asia to redouble its efforts to strengthen the existing regional swap facility 
(i.e., the Chiang Mai Initiative) as the region moves to a collective exchange rate 
adjustment, which is a concrete first step toward closer monetary and exchange rate 
policy coordination. With further development of regional financial markets and 
policy coordination mechanisms, it is not difficult to envision a mutually pegged, 
jointly floating regional exchange regime emerging in the region in the medium term. 
 
Of course, coordinating exchange rate adjustment collectively presents many 
challenges to policy-makers in East Asia because, at the moment, the region lacks 
formal institutions for coordinating macroeconomic policies. But it also offers a rare 
opportunity for these countries to start engaging in intensive policy dialogues on the 
issue of currency adjustment. Since China has already become an integral player of 
the production cum distribution networks in East Asia, it is thus in its own interest to 
actively participate in the coordination of the next round of the exchange rate 
realignment vs. the US dollar.  
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The controversies surrounding the renminbi are mainly motivated by China’s 
large bilateral current account imbalances with the United States. As the US is 
running the twin deficits again at a large magnitude, the presidential election trade 
politics in the US has further complicated the issue. In fact, the RMB-dollar non-
deliverable future market does not indicate that the RMB is very much undervalued.   22
At this stage, China could simply use some structural measures such as phasing out or 
even revoking the value-added export rebates and reducing fiscal incentives to attract 
FDI to effectively address the controversies surrounding the RMB’s valuation issue. 
In addition, China can address the US concerns over China’s large trade surplus 
through some proactive bilateral trade initiatives.  
 
Some have also linked China’s current macroeconomic overheating to its 
undervalued currency. However, the empirical evidence does not seem to support this 
standard textbook explanation. China’s economic overheating was fundamentally 
caused by the banking sector’s incentive to expand balance sheet so to reduce the 
NPL ratio on the book, its on-going interest rate liberalization, and the incentives of 
the local government to over-invest. Unlike the previous cyclical upturns, the present 
one is not likely to cause a runaway inflation because China has not completely 
overcome the problem of over capacity in its industrial sector. The recent rapid 
expansion in fixed assets investment will only exacerbate the over capacity problem 
in the near future. The large increase of the grain price, however, is cyclical in nature 
and can be partially offset by increased imports and by increasing the acreage devoted 
to grain production in the coming years.  
 
China’s pegged exchange rate regime does not reveal any fundamental policy 
inconsistency as long as the capital control is in place and can be strengthened. 
However, to deflect the pressure of capital inflows, China has recently sped up its 
capital account liberalization, thus making its capital control more porous and 
intensifying the policy inconsistency between stable exchange rate and autonomous 
monetary policy. If China intends to make its capital account more open, it should 
then think of moving to an intermediate exchange rate regime preferably taking the 
exchange rate regimes of its neighbors into consideration. However, such a move 
requires credible domestic nominal anchors such as central bank independence and 
inflation targeting and they should be complemented with mechanism that can closely 
monitor potential currency mismatches. Thus some policy sequencing is urgently 
needed. 
 
China’s pegged exchange rate regime will come under greater pressure in the 
medium run should the US dollar require large decline to return the US current 
account into sustainable path. Since the East Asian region jointly is running a large 
current account surplus with the US, the region’s currencies need to play a major role 
in the adjustment process. China, a key player in the East Asian production network, 
should play a leadership role in coordinating with the key East Asian economies in 
the next round of the exchange rate realignment.  
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Table 1: Bilateral and Global Trade Balances as a Share of GDP of Key East Asian Economies and the USA (2003)
Chi na Hong  Kong Tai wan Korea Japan Thai l and M al aysi aPh i l i pi nesI ndonesi aVi etnam Si ngapore USA Sub  Tot al  Gl obal   Tot al
Chi na  4. 6 -0. 1 -1. 6 -1. 0- 0 . 4 -0. 6 -0. 2 -0. 10 . 1- 0 . 14 . 24 . 71 . 8
Hong  Kong -41. 5  -18. 5 -4. 2 -9. 8- 1 . 3 -2. 4 -1. 0 -0. 40 . 4- 4 . 5 18. 4 -64. 7 -5. 5
Tai wan* 0. 7 10. 4  -1. 4 -5. 50 . 0 -0. 4 -0. 6 -0. 40 . 70 . 33 . 17 . 01 . 3
Kor ea 3. 81 . 10 . 6  -3. 60 . 1 -0. 10 . 2 -0. 40 . 4- 0 . 41 . 43 . 11 . 3
Japan 0. 30 . 30 . 30 . 5 0 . 10 . 00 . 0 -0. 20 . 00 . 21 . 22 . 71 . 8
Thai l and 3. 31 . 3 -0. 1 -0. 6 -2. 8  -0. 40 . 20 . 40 . 61 . 74 . 38 . 03 . 1
Ma l aysi a7 . 63 . 61 . 00 . 81 . 30 . 6 0 . 2 -1. 20 . 4- 5 . 3 11. 4 20. 5 20. 4
Phi l i pi nes 4. 22 . 02 . 2 -1. 8 -2. 6- 0 . 4 -0. 2  -0. 9 -0. 3- 0 . 90 . 51 . 7 -4. 9
I ndonesi a0 . 70 . 30 . 61 . 34 . 8- 0 . 30 . 60 . 4 0 . 11 . 03 . 5 13. 0 15. 3
Vi etnam -4. 5 -1. 6 -4. 8 -5. 91 . 2- 2 . 4 -1. 10 . 5 -0. 5 - 4 . 57 . 8 -15. 7 -12. 8
Si ngapore 1. 87 . 7 -0. 92 . 4 -10. 2- 2 . 86 . 00 . 8 -2. 11 . 9 2 . 87 . 2 17. 6
USA -0. 6 -0. 3 -0. 1 -0. 1 -0. 6- 0 . 1 -0. 10 . 0 -0. 10 . 00 . 0 -1. 9 -5. 6
Source:   Author' s cal cul ati on  usi ng  data f rom  I MF  Di recti ons  of   Tr ade  ( 2004) .   Tai wan' s data are f r om   i ts Boar d  of   I nternati onal   Tr ade and data are f or  2002.  
 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of China's Trade by Main Partner and Custom Regimes (in % of total Trade and Billions of $)
World 3  Dragons* Japan EU15 USA ROW
1993
Imports by all custom regimes 100 28 22 15 10 25
  Ordinary Imports 37 3 8 8 5 13
  Imports for processing 35 18 8 2 2 6
  Other custom regimes 28 7 7 6 3 6
2002
Imports by all custom regimes 100 26 18 13 9 33
  Ordinary Imports 44 7 6 8 5 17
  Imports for processing 41 16 8 2 2 12
  Other custom regimes 15 3 3 3 2 4
World 3  Dragons* Japan EU15 USA ROW
1993
Exports by all custom regimes 100 29 17 13 18 22
  Ordinary Exports 47 12 10 7 6 13
  Exports from processed imports 48 16 7 7 13 6
  Other custom regimes 5 0 0 0 0 4
2002
Exports by all custom regimes 100 25 15 15 21 24
  Ordinary Exports 42 8 6 7 7 15
  Exports from processed imports 55 16 9 8 14 8
  Other custom regimes 3 1 0 0 1 1
World 3  Dragons* Japan EU15 USA ROW
1993
All custom regimes -12.2 -2.4 -7.5 -3.5 6.3 -5.1
  Ordinary Trade 5.2 8 0.7 -2 0 -1.5
  Processed Trade 7.9 -3.8 -1.3 -4.2 9.7 -1
  Other custom regimes -25.2 -6.6 -6.9 -5.8 -3.4 -2.6
2002
All custom regimes 30.4 3.2 -5 9.7 42.7 -20.2
  Ordinary Trade 7.1 3.4 1.1 -3.1 6.7 -1
  Processed Trade 57.7 5.9 3.1 19.6 39.9 -10.9
  Other custom regimes -34.4 -6.1 -9.3 -6.8 -4 -8.2
* 3 dragons are Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan
Source: China Customs Statistics, and Gaulier, et al (2004)
Imports (%Percent)
Exports (% Percent)
Trade Balances (In Billions of Dollars)
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Table 3: China's Tariff Reduction, 1982-2002 (Percent and Billions of US Dollars)
Year Unweighted Average Weighted Average Dispersion Maximum Trade Balance
1982 55.6 .. .. .. 3
1985 43.3 .. .. .. -14.9
1988 43.7 .. .. .. -7.8
1991 44.1 .. .. .. 8.1
1992 42.9 40.6 .. 220 4.3
1993 39.9 38.4 29.9 220 -12.2
1994 36.3 35.5 27.9 .. 5.4
1995 35.2 26.8 .. 220 16.7
1996 23.6 22.6 17.4 121.6 12.2
1997 17.6 16 13 121.6 40.4
1998 17.5 15.7 13 121.6 43.4
2000 16.4 .. .. .. 29.2
2001 15.3 9.1 12.1 121.6 24.1
2002 12.3 6.4 9.1 71 30.3
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2004 and China Customs Statistics, Various Issues  
 
Table 4: China's Balance of Payment Statistics
DESCRIPTOR (billions of USD) 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 (1-6)
CURRENT ACCOUNT 12.0 1.6 7.2 37.0 31.5 21.1 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 7.5
  Trade in goods 9.2 18.1 19.5 46.2 46.6 36.0 34.5 34.0 44.2 44.7 5.9
  Trade in services 1.5 -6.1 -2.0 -3.4 -2.8 -5.3 -5.6 -5.9 -6.8 -8.6 -5.9
  Balance on goods and services 10.7 12.0 17.6 42.8 43.8 30.6 28.9 28.1 37.4 36.1 0.0
  N e t  C u r r e n t  t r a n s f e r 0 . 31 . 42 . 15 . 14 . 34 . 96 . 38 . 5 1 3 . 0 1 7 . 6 9 . 9
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 3.3 38.7 40.0 21.0 -6.3 5.2 2.0 34.8 32.3 52.7 66.8
  Capital Account      n.a.      n.a.     n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Foreign Direct Investment 2.7 33.8 38.1 41.7 41.1 37.0 37.5 37.4 46.8 47.2 30.5
  Portfolio Investment n.a 0.8 1.7 6.9 -3.7 -11.2 -4.0 -19.4 -10.3 11.4 27.7
  Other Investment  0.8 4.0 0.2 -27.6 -43.7 -20.5 -31.5 16.9 -4.1 -5.9 8.6
  ERRORS AND OMISSIONS -3.2 -17.8 -15.5 -22.1 -18.9 -17.6 -11.7 -4.7 7.5 18.4 -7.3
OVERALL BALANCE 12.0 22.5 31.7 35.9 6.2 8.7 10.7 47.4 75.2 117.0 67.0
FINANCING -12.0 -22.5 -31.7 -35.9 -6.2 -8.7 -10.7 -47.4 -75.2 -117.0 -67.0
RESERVE ASSETS CHANGE         -12.0 -22.5 -31.7 -35.9 -6.2 -8.7 -10.7 -47.4 -75.2 -117.0 -67.0
Sources:  IFS for 1990-2002 and SAFE (2003,   2004,  J an uary to  J un e)
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Table 5: Declining Terms of Trade with Key Trading Partners (1993-2000)
Products USA EU Japan NIES ASEAN Other LDCs
All Products -23 -28 -26 -17 -8 -3
Non-Fuel Primary Products 0 -36 4 5 34 15
Manufactured Goods -24 -27 -28 -20 -24 -21
Labor or Resource Intensive Prod -48 -12 -37 -2 -9 -7
Low-Tech Products -27 -36 -15 -5 -14 -13
Medium-Tech Products -42 -28 -31 -28 -26 -59
High-Tech Products 13 -23 -35 -29 -43 -7
Source: Zheng and Zhao (2002) based on statistics from the Chinese Customs Statistic Yearbook
 
Table 6: China's Annual Fixed Assets Investment (2001-October 2004) (Billions of Yuan)
Total Growth Rate Share Total Growth Rate Share Total Growth Rate Share Total Growth Rate Share
Total Fixed Assets Investment (TFAI) 2782.7 13.7 100 3294.2 17.4 100 4264.3 28.4 100 4355.6 29.5 100
   Real Estate Development 624.5 25.3 22.4 773.6 21.9 23.5 1010.6 29.7 23.6 806.4 26.6 18.5
  Central Government Investment 645.8 3.7 23.5 637.4 -2.7 19.4 607.9 -4.6 14.2 666 4.9 15.3
  Local-Level Investment 2127.8 17.1 76.5 2656.7 23.4 80.6 3656.4 36.2 85.3 3689.5 35.2 84.7
Funding Sources
  National Budget 200.8 20.3 7.2 254.4 26.8 7.5 250.8 -1.5 5.5
  Loans 621 9.1 22.2 773.5 24.6 22.8 1077.9 39.3 23.5
  Bonds 14.2 -22 0.5 17.8 26.4 0.5 15.3 -14.5 0.3
  Foreign Funds 152.7 4.4 5.5 175.8 15.1 5.2 217.6 23.8 4.8
     FDI 94.8 21 3.4 119.4 25.9 3.5 159.4 33.5 3.5
  Self Raised Funds 1292.6 21.3 46.3 155.7 20.5 45.8 2175.3 39.7 47.5
  Others 509.9 23.7 18.3 620.6 21.7 18.3 843.1 35.9 18.4
Memorandum Items
TFAI/GDP 29.0 32.2 36.5 46.8
Sources: State Statistic Bureau (2004)
Note: Growth rate is from the same period of the previous year. Third quarter GDP of 2004 is used to calculate TFAI share for 2004 so there are over estimation of the 10 month figure for 2004 
Local-level projects may include both state and non-state investment.
2001 2002 2003 2004 (1 to October)
 
 
Table 7: Sources of Finance (100 million yuan)
Total Weights
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Total Finance 16555 23976 35154 100 100 100
  Bank Finance 12558 19228 29936 75.9 80.2 85.1
  Debt Finance 2598 3461 3525 15.7 14.4 10
  Corporate Bond  147 325 336 0.9 1.4 1
  Equity Finance 1252 962 1357 7.6 4 3.9
Source: Huang (2004)
 




Foreign Exchange Reserves 0.67 0.75
Dependent Variable: Foreign Exchange Reserve
Variables F-Statistics Significance
M2 2.57 0.04
Foreign Exchange Reserve 52.7 0
Source: Statistical test conducted by the author
   29
Table 9: Exchange Rate Regimes
I. Fixed Arragements
  a) Currency Unions
  b) Currency Boards (Dollarization)
  c) Truly Fiexed Exchange Rates
II. Intermediate Arrangements
  a) Adjustable Pegs
  b) Crawling Pegs
  c) Basket Pegs
  d) Target Zone and Bands
III. Floats
  a) Managed Floats
  b) Free Floats
Source: Frankel (1999)








Dual or Multiple 
Exchange Rates
Annual Inflation Rate
Standard 38.8 5.3 74.8 173.9 n.a
Dual Rates 20.7 10.1 29.7 45.5 167.4
Per-Capital GDP Growth 
Standard 1.4 2.2 1.9 0.5 n.a
Dual Rates 1.7 2.6 1.5 1.1 0.8
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
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Figure 2: Processing Trade Drives China's Exports 
 
In % of Total Imports 


























Source:  China Customs Statistics and Lemoine (2004).   31
Figure 3: Foreign Affiliates are the Engine of China's Trade Expansion 
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Source:  China Customs Statistics and Lemoine (2004). 
 
Figure 4: East-Asian Countries’ Share in Total US Trade Deficit 

















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
 
Source:  CEPII-CHELEM Database and Lemoine (2004) 
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Figure 8: REER in the US, China and Taiwan 











































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: The Trilemma 
Stable Exchange Rate
Capital Control  Currency Board 
Floating Exchange Rate
Free Capital Flows  Autonomous Monetary Policy   34
Figure 9: REER in Japan and Korea 

































































Figure 10: REER in Key ASEAN Economies 
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Figure 11: Comparision of PBOC 3-Month Relending Rates and 





















































































































































































































































































US TREASURY BILL 3 MONTH (FT) - MIDDLE RATE
PBOC RELENDING RATE, 3M - MIDDLE RATE
US ARM (FREDDIE MAC) TREAS.INDEX 1 YR -
MIDDLE RATE
US FRM 15YR (FREDDIE MAC AVG)-N CNTRL -
MIDDLE RATE
 